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This paper examines whether infrastructure investment 
has contributed to East Asia’s economic growth using 
both a growth accounting framework and cross-country 
regressions. For most of the variables used, both the 
growth accounting exercise and cross-country regressions 
fail to find a significant link between infrastructure, 
productivity and growth. These conclusions contrast 
strongly with previous studies finding positive and 
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significant effect for all infrastructure variables in the 
context of a production function study. This leads us to 
conclude that results from studies using macro-level data 
should be considered with extreme caution. The Authors 
suggest that infrastructure investment may have had the 
primary function of relieving constraints and bottlenecks 
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Policy-makers in developing East Asia see infrastructure investment as an essential 
determinant of growth.1 The two fastest-growing economies in the region, China and 
Vietnam, are investing around 10 percent of GDP in infrastructure, and even at that rate they 
are struggling to keep pace with demand for electricity and telephones, and to install major 
transport networks.  Hopes for a significant contribution to growth in the Greater Mekong 
countries – Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and China – are centered on plans 
for greater integration of transport and energy markets. Since its election in late 2004, the new 
Indonesian government has made infrastructure a national priority, seeking to restore 
investment to its pre-crisis level of 5-6 percent of GDP.  
 
The current emphasis on infrastructure draws its inspiration from East Asia’s economic 
history, including the experience of countries such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Taiwan, China, which also made large investments in infrastructure.  East Asia’s 
accumulation of infrastructure stocks has outpaced infrastructure investment in other regions 
(Table 1).  And East Asia’s economic growth has outpaced the growth of other world regions. 
Between 1975 and 2005, East Asia’s GDP increased ten-fold; South Asia’s GDP increased 
five-fold; and all other regions’ economies grew by factors of between two and three.2  For 
most policy-makers this is no coincidence.  
 
Table 1: Growth of GDP and Infrastructure Stocks 
1995 levels as multiples of 1975 levels 
 GDP Electricity Roads Telecoms
East Asia 4.8 5.9 2.9 15.5
South Asia 2.6 4.4 2.5 8.2
Middle East & North Africa 1.8 6.1 2.1 7.2
Latin America & Caribbean 1.8 3.0 1.9 5.1
OECD 1.8 1.6 1.4 2.2
Pacific 1.7 2.0 4.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 2.6 1.7 3.9
Eastern Europe 1.0 1.6 1.2 6.9
GDP – PPP constant 2000 international $; Electricity - MW of generating capacity; Roads – km of paved 
road; Telecoms – number of main lines.  See Annex 1 for construction.  Sources: World Development 
Indicators and Canning (1998) 
                                                 
1 See ADB, IBRD, WB, JICA, (2005). 
2 Difference in GDP (PPP) in constant 2000 dollars between 1975 and 2005. 
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But academics aren’t so sure. Perhaps it is East Asia’s growth success that has driven the high 
rate of infrastructure investment, rather than the other way around.  In the neoclassical growth 
model, exogenous shocks, such as new technology, increase the rate of return to capital, 
inducing investment. Investment increases the stock of capital, thereby reducing the rate of 
return to capital and restoring equilibrium at the initial capital-labor ratio and a higher level of 
output.3 Within this framework, if infrastructure is merely another form of capital with 
decreasing returns, infrastructure investment does not “cause” long-term growth, it is an 
inevitable consequence of growth, but the sources of growth must be found elsewhere. 
 
Decreasing returns to infrastructure investment can certainly be observed. For example, 
electricity supply capacity that exceeds demand growth provides a poor return on investment, 
as several countries found in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis when economies and 
electricity demand contracted.  And most of East Asia’s infrastructure investment has 
occurred as a reaction to emerging constraints.  So there are certainly arguments that 
infrastructure has the same properties as assumed in the neoclassical framework for other 
forms of capital. 
 
But the neoclassical growth model also assumes that investment responds automatically to 
changes in rates of return. In fact, most infrastructure services are not provided in freely 
functioning markets. Government regulation, market power and externalities mean that 
infrastructure services are rarely provided at prices that represent the cost of inputs or their 
marginal social value.  And infrastructure investments are dominated by government 
decision-making (e.g. public investment) and regulatory constraints (e.g. spatial planning, 
environmental considerations, etc).  If the link between high rates of return and investment is 
blocked, the economy will not grow in accordance with the neoclassical model’s predictions.   
 
Complete non-responsiveness of infrastructure investment could be a partial explanation for 
differences in observed long-run growth rates across countries.4  Mere differences in the 
speed with which infrastructure investment responds to infrastructure constraints would only 
affect the speed with which economies return to the long-run equilibrium growth path 
following a shock, and would not determine countries’ long-run growth rates.  But for 
                                                 
3 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2005). 
4 It is assumed that infrastructure services are strongly complementary with modern technologies – that is other 
forms of capital investment cannot substitute for infrastructure services. 
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practical policy purposes, such “transitory” growth rates are just as important as long-run 
growth.  In a developing economy with chronic under-supply of infrastructure, transitory 
growth could conceivably last for decades. 
 
Following this line of argument, infrastructure policies might play a role in explaining East 
Asia’s relative growth success if East Asia is more effective than other regions in relieving 
infrastructure constraints as they emerge. A small piece of evidence to this effect may be seen 
in the results of enterprise surveys (Table 2), which indicate that new connections are 
provided to firms more quickly and that service interruptions are lest costly in East Asia than 
in most developing regions.  




Value lost to power 






East Asia & Pacific 21 2.6 18 16 
Europe & Central Asia 15 3.0 9 16 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 34 4.1 35 36 
Middle East & North 
Africa 62 4.3 44 49 
South Asia 49 7.4 29 50 
Sub-Saharan Africa 38 5.9 42 54 
OECD 10 2.3 — 9 
Source: The data are derived from World Bank Investment Climate Assessments, and reported at 
www.enterprisesurveys.org (last visited January 10, 2008) 
 
However, this could again reflect causality running the other way round, as economies with 
stronger growth have readily available resources to address such bottlenecks as they become 
apparent. 
 
Beyond the neoclassical growth framework, endogenous growth theory envisages instances 
where an aggregate economy may exhibit increasing returns to scale, notwithstanding the 
presence of diminishing or constant returns to individual factors.5 If infrastructure stocks play 
a role in the realization of these economies of scale, infrastructure policy has a role in 
determining long-run growth. 
 
An important feature East Asia’s infrastructure history has been the construction of major 
transport links between cities.  Korea’s Seoul-Pusan highway built in the 1960s, Malaysia’s 
road network built in the 1970s and 1980s, China’s rail network and more recent expressways 
                                                 
5 See Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2005) for a review of endogenous growth models. 
 5
development, and Vietnam’s Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi-Haiphong highways have 
all enlarged and integrated domestic markets, as well as providing the logistical connections 
for access to ports and international markets.  Further investment in these transport networks 
may not give the same boost to productivity, but it is possible that the larger markets they 
create facilitates the exploitation of economies of scale within firms, the production of more 
specialized goods and services, and better and more specialized skills matches between 
employers and workers.  That is, notwithstanding the presence of diminishing returns to 
infrastructure investment, the creation of infrastructure networks could contribute to the rate 
of innovation and technological advance in the economy, and thereby lift the long-term 
growth rate. 
 
An alternative possible source of ongoing growth may lie in knowledge externalities. Cities 
play an important role in facilitating the exchange of ideas and innovation, and hence 
advancing the technological frontier.  To the extent that infrastructure services affect the 
efficiency of cities and the effectiveness with which knowledge is shared, infrastructure 
services may influence the rate of productivity growth.6 Moreover, this raises the question of 
whether infrastructure investment should be directed in priority to large urban areas or to 
lagging regions. It has been hypothesized (Williamson, 1965), that poor countries would go 
first through a process of concentration, industrialization and regional divergence, in which 
infrastructure investment is if anything following development, but that, as congestion in 
cities becomes too important, a reversed process of deconcentration and regional convergence 
occurs, which could be sustained by regional infrastructure investment. If these linkages are 
important, understanding the dynamic of cities should play a particularly important role in 
analyzing the sources of East Asia’s growth.  Overall, however, the evidence on the link 
between urbanization, infrastructure and growth is still very limited. East Asia is one of the 
least urbanized regions in the world.  But its rate of urbanization is one of the fastest and the 
East Asian mega-cities are comparably large and more densely populated. Average urban 
densities in East Asia range from 10,000 to around 15,000 persons per sq km – about double 
the urban densities of Latin America; triple those of Europe; and ten times those of US cities. 
On the Williamson’s hypothesis, some corroborating evidence has been found for Korea (see 
Henderson, Shalizi and Venables, 2001), but more work is still due to guide policies.7 
                                                 
6 See Henderson (2005) on urbanization and growth. 




While not a channel that has been greatly explored in modern growth theory, it is plausible 
that growth is enhanced in countries with lower poverty, all else equal.  Poverty reduction 
could serve to increase market size (e.g. greater disposable income), enhance labor 
productivity (e.g. health improvements), and enhance innovation through improved human 
capital (e.g. less poor populations might invest more in education; there may be less scope for 
innovation in an agrarian society, etc.).  If such linkages are important, ensuring that all 
sections of the population are provided with infrastructure could indirectly boost growth by 
reducing poverty. It is notable that East Asia has been more successful in providing rural 
access to all-weather roads than other developing regions.  Access to roads has been shown in 
numerous studies to have a significant effect on rural poverty (Jacoby, 2000; Gibson and 
Rozelle, 2003). 
 
Table 3: Proportion of rural population living within two kilometers of an all-weather road 
Sub-Saharan Africa 30 
Middle East & North Africa 34 
Latin America & Caribbean 38 
South Asia 58 
Europe & Central Asia 75 
East Asia 94 
Source: Roberts et al (2006). 
 
Theoretical speculation on the relationship between infrastructure and growth should be tested 
against empirical observations. Examining 80 econometric specifications from 30 studies 
using macro-level data, Straub (2007) reports a significant positive effect of infrastructure on 
output or growth in 56 percent of specifications, no significant effect in 38 percent, and a 
significant negative effect in 6 percent.  Among the studies that do find positive effects there 
is wide variation in their estimated magnitude.   
 
There are several possible reasons for the variation in empirical results.  It seems quite likely 
that the effects of infrastructure investment do, indeed, vary from location to location, and 
across different stages of economic development.  A further source of variation is the 
theoretical framework used. Straub (2007) observes that a positive effect of infrastructure on 
growth is more likely to be detected in studies based on a production function than studies 
using cross-country regressions. The empirical literature frequently fails to set out the 
theoretical issues that are being tested so that results may not be strictly comparable, a number 
of methodological problems are either not considered or cannot be addressed with macro-
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level data, and above all, aggregate data are simply not adequate to address the important 
policy issues.   
 
To illustrate this, our paper examines whether infrastructure investment has, indeed, 
contributed to East Asia’s economic growth using both a growth accounting framework and 
cross-country regressions.  Our results are then contrasted with the results of Seethepalli, 
Bramati, and Veredas (2007), who use a production function specification to examine the 
impact of infrastructure on East Asia’s growth.  With all three methodologies focused on the 
same region and the same time-frame, any significant findings that recur across 
methodologies would shed light on whether infrastructure investment has indeed been a cause 
of economic growth in East Asia.  
 
Two main conclusions emerge. First of all, for most of the variables used both the growth 
accounting exercise and cross-country regressions fail to find a significant link between 
infrastructure, productivity and growth. When they do, they produce rather contradictory 
conclusions, as growth accounting indicates no contribution of infrastructure to productivity 
in the richer countries (South Korea and Singapore), and some contribution in the relatively 
poorest countries (of telecommunications in Indonesia and Philippines, and of roads in 
Thailand), while cross-country growth regressions tend to indicate that the effects are 
generally negative for low-income countries and positive only for the high-income ones. 
 
Second, these conclusions contrast strongly with those of Seethepalli, Bramati and Veredas 
(2007), who find positive and significant effects for all infrastructure variables in the context 
of a production function study. This leads us to conclude that results from studies using 
macro-level data should be considered with extreme caution. Given that macroeconomic data 
give only limited support to the notion that infrastructure investment has driven growth in 
East Asia, we conclude by speculating on other aspects, in particular the idea that 
infrastructure investment may have had the primary function of relieving constraints and 
bottlenecks as they arose. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the growth accounting exercise. 
Section 3 turns to cross-country growth regressions. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results, 
compares them to other related studies and concludes. 
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2. Growth accounting 
2.1. Methodology 
Standard growth accounting 
 
The formal framework of growth accounting is the production function 
 
(1)   ),(. LKFAY = , 
 
where Y is aggregate GDP, A is the time-varying total factor productivity (TFP) and K and L 
are respectively (total) capital and labor. Taking logs and differentiating with respect to time 
yields 
 












Y KL &&&& .. ++= . 
 
Assuming that marginal factor productivities equal factor prices, we get the standard formula 
for growth accounting, where the growth of TFP is computed as the residual between the 
growth of GDP and the growth of factors: 
 








A KL &&&& −−= . 
 
In this equation LS  and KS are therefore the respective observed shares of income. 
Importantly, (3) is typically not implemented through econometric estimation but rather 
through direct calculation: all the variables on the right-hand side are observed. As reported in 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (3) has been used in many country-specific studies with the objective 
of calculating TFP growth.  
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Growth accounting with infrastructure 
 
Assume, as in Hulten et al. (2005) that infrastructure (denoted X in the following equations) 
influences output through two channels. First, it impacts TFP through 
 
(4)   ηXAXAA .~)( ==  
where A~ is the « true » TFP and η is the elasticity of A with respect to X.  Here, infrastructure 
raises output without any payments by firms for infrastructure services. This channel captures 
the externality aspect of infrastructure. 
 
Second, infrastructure can enter the production function as an additional production factor:  
 
(5)  ),,~(..~ XLKFXAY η= . 
 
where K~ is the stock of non-infrastructure capital.  
 
The presence of infrastructure as one more factor reflects its market-mediated impact, 
whereby firms pay for infrastructure services.  
 
This leads to: 
















~ &&&&&& ++++= η  
 
where XS is the share of GDP that accrues to market-mediated infrastructure and KS
~
the share 
of revenue that accrues to non-infrastructure capital.  
 
A few remarks are in order. First,η , the elasticity of TFP with respect to infrastructure, is not 
observable as it captures the externality dimension of infrastructure: there are no payments 
involved, and therefore no income and price data can be used. Second, (6) shows that should 
data on XS be available, that relationship would enable us to disentangle the market-mediated 
influence of infrastructure from its externality incidence. However, even though in principle 
the market-mediated part of infrastructure could be tracked by the corresponding payments 
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and prices, in practice data on infrastructure prices are not available in a consistent way for 
the countries under analysis.  In addition, available data on capital do not distinguish between 
different types of capital, including infrastructure. Instead of having data on K~ , we have data 
on K.  
Because of this, it is clearer to rewrite to model so as to fit the available data, as:  
 
(5’)  ),(..~ LKFXAY η=  
 
which leads to 














Finally, the trick is to substitute (3) into (6’), so that we get (appending an error term):  
 











The left-hand side of (7) is TFP growth as computed (not estimated) in the standard growth 
accounting approach. An alternative route to a full estimation of (6’) is thus to estimate the 
reduced form (7) using the (year by year) results of (3) in terms of TFP growth rates (
A
A& ), 
which is convenient as these are available from standard growth accounting exercises for a 
number of countries.  
 
Either (7) or (6’) provide an estimation of η , the pure externality effect of infrastructure, as 
opposed to the full elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure. For example, if an 
estimation of (7) produces a value for η  not significantly different from zero, it suggests that 
infrastructure has no externality role in that particular economy. However, because K includes 
X, it does not imply that infrastructure is not productive: it is just not more productive than 
other types of capital.  





, the “true” TFP growth. 
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2.2. Data and estimation 
 
There are two main options for estimating (7). One is based on regional panel data, while the 
other one is a country-per-country approach based on time series data. 
 
The panel estimation technique rests on the assumption that a common production function 
exists for the Asian countries under analysis, with individual country effects to be controlled 
for. While this approach has been extensively used with state / provincial panel data for India 
(Hulten et al. (2005)), Italy (La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000)) and the US (Holtz-Eakin 
(1994)), the above assumption is dubious when applied to a set of countries as diverse as 
those in our sample. We report below tentative panel estimations that confirm such cross-
country heterogeneity.  
 
We therefore give priority to individual country estimations, which more realistically do not 
assume that there is a common underlying technology for all countries. This has been the 
approach used by most non-infrastructure growth accounting studies. 8  
 
Concerning any possible simultaneity in the estimations, note again that the left hand-side 
quantity in (8) – TFP growth – is computed directly from data, not estimated. In particular, we 
do not have to worry about the typical simultaneity problem in regression-based growth 
accounting studies, namely reverse causation from the growth rates of GDP to K. The only 
possible remaining source of simultaneity would be an influence of TFP growth on 
investment in infrastructure, 
X
X& . Possible causes of simultaneity include endogenous 
responses of infrastructure policies to TFP growth, making it necessary to test the presence of 
reverse causation in the data.  
 
Country-specific estimations, as opposed to panel estimations, call for longer time series in 
order to produce efficient estimators. Two sets of long time series can be considered. First, 
physical indicators of infrastructure stocks have been used in the literature. Canning (1999) 
uses indicators of telephones lines availability, electricity generating power and length of 
                                                 
8 See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
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paved roads and railways to estimate an aggregate production function. This dataset includes 
time series of usable length for key infrastructures (excluding water) for all countries included 
in our exercise. Second, it is in theory possible to build time series of infrastructure stocks 
based on investment data together with the perpetual inventory method – just as time series of 
K are normally constructed. Unfortunately, in practice financial data on infrastructure (in 
monetary terms or as percentage of GDP) are scarce for the sample countries. Also, some 
authors (see Pritchett, 1996) have warned against the poor quality of financial indicators of 
public investment. For these reasons, we concentrate on physical indicators of infrastructure.  
 
With respect to explanatory variables, we have used data from the Canning database in five 
countries: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and Singapore. The following series 
of physical infrastructure indicators from the Canning (1998) database, as extended with the 
World Bank’s infrastructure database, have been used: 
 
- Number of telephones and telephone main lines; 
- Electricity generating capacity; 
- Total roads (railways and paved roads). 
 
Finally, the TFP growth rates calculated by the Asian Productivity Organization (APO, 2004) 
for the five countries under analysis have been used as the dependent variable, as in (7). The 
APO has calculated (not estimated) TFP growth rates following the standard methodology 
that is, following equation (3) and, in addition, taking into account changes in labor quality.  
 
 
2.3. Results  
 
The main results from individual growth accounting regressions are reported in Table 4. First, 
in South Korea and Singapore, which are the two most developed economies in our sample 
(Figure 1), we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the three infrastructure 
variables are zero. Again, recall that the interpretation for this result is not that infrastructure 
is not productive but rather that there is no evidence from this exercise that it is more 
productive than other types of capital. 
 
 13
Second, in Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines we report preliminary evidence that some 
infrastructure variables are significantly more – or less – productive than other types of 
capital.  
 
In Indonesia, the number of telephones has a positive coefficient of 0.12, significant at the 
90% level. This suggests a productivity level above that of the rest of capital, specifically an 
externality effect expressed as an output elasticity of 0.12. However, in the same country 
electricity generating capacity appears to be less productive, at the 95% level of significance. 
With a R2 of 0.59, it is interesting to note that the growth of the two significant infrastructure 
indicators seem to explain a large share of the standard TFP growth. Since the electricity 
generating capacity variable carries a negative coefficient, it implies that the bulk of TFP 
growth has rested on the increase in the number of telephones. The estimate of the “true” TFP 
growth (after accounting for infrastructure growth) is only 0.0430% per year.  
 
In the Philippines, the telephone variable also has a positive coefficient, significant at the 90% 
level, again supporting externalities from this variable. 
 
The road variable is significant in only one country, Thailand, at the 95% level. But with a R2 
of 0.49, this variable alone explains a lot of the standard TFP growth. The estimate of the true 
TFP growth is a negative -0.3964% per year – suggesting that roads have been a primary 
driving force of productivity growth. With 11 observations only in Thailand, however, caution 
is warranted in interpreting this result. 
 
One possible interpretation for the presence of two groups, with the most developed countries 
(South Korea and Taiwan, China) exhibiting no specific impact of infrastructure, is that 
infrastructure is not a binding constraint in these countries because it has been tailored to the 
needs of the economy, whereas it is in developing countries such as Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia, infrastructure has yet to catch up with the economy’s needs and could still be a 
bottleneck. The negative impact of electricity generating capacity in Indonesia could possibly 
be interpreted in this context as the result of the instability of infrastructure needs in a rapidly 
changing economy.  
 
However, this interpretation, which is impossible to test with a sample of 5 countries, is 
clearly not consistent with the results reported in the next section on growth regressions, 
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which are based on a broader sample of countries. Tables 9 to 12 show that the interaction 
terms between the Low-Income dummy and infrastructure variables often carry a significantly 
negative coefficient. This suggests that the explanation for the mixed outcome from our 
growth accounting regressions could be related to factors which are orthogonal to GDP, for 
example if the productivity impact of the infrastructure stock is conditional on complementary 





















































The simple OLS specification based on equation (7) has been tested in several directions. 
First, the regressions have been tested for the presence of endogeneity. For each country, 
Hausman tests using various lags of the explanatory variables as instruments have been 
performed, all rejecting endogeneity. However, for several countries autocorrelation for some 
of the exogenous variables is rejected, making the latter invalid instruments for Hausman 
tests. In those specific cases, we follow the literature9 in using population and population 
density (both contemporary and lagged) as instruments for Hausman test, which also leads to 
the rejection of endogeneity.  
 
Second, time dummies were tentatively introduced as explanatory variables in each of the 
regressions above. The objective of this introduction was to test for possible time-varying 
effects on TFP growth, for example the role of the 1997 crisis in Asia. We do not report the 
                                                 
9 See Straub (2007). 
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results of these estimations as the time variable is never a significant determinant of TFP 
growth.  
 
Thirdly, the individual country regressions used above have the obvious shortcoming that they 
cannot account for cross-country variations. Could not pooled data reveal cross-country 
regularities masked by individual estimations? With the important caveat noted above – a 
common technology in all five country is a strong assumption – pooled/panel estimations 
were performed under various specifications. Table 5 reports the outcome of these 
estimations, with none of the infrastructure significantly different from zero and very low R2.  
  
Next, we turn to the results from cross-country regressions. 
3. Growth regression 
 
This section applies growth regression techniques to the study of the link between 
infrastructure and growth in the case of East Asian countries.  
 
3.1 Standard framework 
 
Standard cross-country regressions in general start from a specification that intends to explain 
real per capita GDP growth by the initial level of real per capita GDP and explanatory factors 
such as physical investment, human capital (for example proxied by enrollment in different 
education levels) and additional factors that vary across studies. Indeed, approximately 60 
different variables have been used in this abundant literature (Romp and de Haan, 2005), of 
which varying subsets have been deemed “robust” by different authors.10 
 






i ZK νγβα +++= i0i y  g  
 
                                                 
10 See Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Temple (2000) for a discussion. 
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where gi is the growth rate of real per capita GDP for country i, yi0 is initial income (possibly 








We opt for physical infrastructure indicators. Three specific reasons support this choice.11  
 
1. As mentioned above, public investment data are subject to a lot of problems, which 
make them unlikely to capture infrastructure stock or availability properly.  
2. Physical indicators allow for a longer time frame and a higher number of countries. 
3. They will allow for direct comparisons with the results from the growth accounting 
exercise. 
 
Physical indicators for three different sectors (telecom, energy and transport) are taken from 
Canning’s database, covering the 1971-1995 period. Specifically, we use the following series: 
 
• Main telephone lines per 1,000 people. This series is extended up to 2002/2003 using 
Estache and Goicoechea (2005). 
• Electricity generating capacity in million kilowatt per 1,000 people. 
• Rail route length in km per 1,000 people. 
• Paved road length in km per 1,000 people. 
 
Additionally, we perform some tests with alternative variables: Telephone mainlines (per 
1,000 people) from the World Bank World Development Indicator (WDI), fixed line and 
mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) also from WDI, to capture the rise in mobile 
connections in the second half of the 1990s, roads total network and percentage of paved 
roads from WDI, which is used here as a quality proxy. We introduce additional proxies for 
                                                 
11 See Straub (2007) for a more general discussion of public investment versus physical infrastructure indicators. 
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the quality of the other services under study, namely telephone faults (per 100 mainlines) and 
electric power transmission and distribution losses in % of output, both from WDI. Other 
general data include (from WDI, unless mentioned otherwise) measures of GDP per capita, 
gross fixed capital formation, primary and secondary school enrollment (from Barro and Lee, 
2000), primary and secondary schooling expenditures, government stability and Corruption 
(from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide), life expectancy, M2/GDP (as 




We rely on a sample of 93 developing or emerging countries. Of these 40 are classified by the 
World Bank as low income, 25 as lower middle income, 19 as upper middle income and 9 as 
high income. Note that this last category includes Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and a 
number of oil producing countries. Overall, 16 East Asian and Pacific countries are included: 
China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua 




In what follows we present two types of estimations. First, we perform simple cross country 
estimations based on the collapsed data set for 1971-1995 or 1984-1995 alternatively, using 
the rate of growth of GDP per capita as dependent variable and standard controls (initial level 
of GDP, investment, proxies for human capital). In each case, we instrument potentially 
endogenous infrastructure indicators and perform related tests. We also test specifications 
with different set of regional dummies (specific East Asian dummy, income groups), and the 
alternative infrastructure indicators mentioned above. 
 
Then, we present panel regressions on 5-year subperiod averages with the same dependent 
variable. This frequency should result in enough variations in infrastructure indicators to 
allow the use of fixed effects. Following best practice in this type of exercise, we compare 
fixed vs. random effects and perform instrumental estimations. Finally, we use Arellano-Bond 





Table 6 presents the results from cross country regressions with the 1971-1995 averages. 
Overall, only the number of telephone lines per hab. is significant, with a positive sign of 
0.022. This implies that an increase in 100 lines per hab., from the average level over the 
period of Venezuela (63) to that of Korea (163) would add 2.2 points to the average growth 
rate of per capita GDP. All other infrastructure variables are insignificant and the paved roads 
length one is of the wrong sign. In columns 5 and 6, we add measures of quality of 
infrastructure, namely the number of telephone faults and electricity losses. These measures 
are not significant and the main indicators’ coefficients are unchanged.  
 
When considering instead the 1984-1995 period, in Table 7, which in particular enables us to 
introduce indices of government stability and corruption as additional control variables, we 
get even less conclusive results. The number of phone lines is now only significant when 
quality is controlled for and its coefficient is about half of the 1971-1995 one, while the paved 
roads variable is now negative and significant. 
 
In Tables 8 and 9, we address the fact that infrastructure stocks may be determined 
simultaneously with output. Following previous contributions in the literature, we use 
beginning of the period (1971) values of the indicators themselves, as well as 1971 values of 
the level of population, population density and the share of agriculture in GDP. Overall, the 
results from IV estimations are similar to simple OLS. The coefficient for the number of 
phone lines is now larger, between 2.8 (1971-1995) and 4.7 (1984-1995). Note however that a 
Wu-Hausman test does not reject exogeneity in all but one of the 12 estimations. 
 
Next, we test regional effects by interacting the infrastructure indicators with regional 
dummies. Tables 9 to 13 present the results for telecom, energy, railroad and roads 
respectively. In each case, we first use an East Asian dummy, then dummies for low and 
middle income countries respectively. 
 
As for telecom, the group of East Asian countries does not display any significantly different 
behavior (the coefficient is negative but not significant), while income classification indicates 
that telecom impact is significantly lower in low income countries, a result that may appeal to 
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Röller and Waverman’s (1999) conclusions on network externalities in telecom kicking in at 
near universal coverage level. 
 
In Table 10, we observe that the impact of energy is positive and significant for the subgroup 
of East Asian countries, suggesting that the development of the electric network may have 
been an important contributor to growth of per capita output during the period. To compare 
again the same countries as before, the difference between the period average electricity 
generating capacity of Korea (0.667 million kw per 1,000 hab.) and that of Venezuela (0.376) 
implies an additional 1.1% per capita GDP growth. As for the level of development, the 
impact of electricity generation appears lower in low and middle income countries. 
 
In Table 10, the impact of the railroad network is positive and weakly significant for East 
Asian countries, and it is again lower for low and middle income countries (actually slightly 
negative for low income ones). Finally, a similar pattern is repeated in Table 13 with respect 
to paved roads. Note finally, that in all cases instrumental estimations fail to yield significant 
results, and that the Wu-Hausman test fails to reject exogeneity in all but one of the 8 
specifications tested. 
 
Overall, this exercise seems to provide two main insights. First, East Asian countries display 
positive and significant returns from infrastructure across most dimensions. Second, a pattern 
emerges that indicates low or possibly negative returns for low income countries, slightly 
higher returns for middle income ones and strongly positive returns for the richer countries in 
the sample. The type of data we use does not allow for a very detailed analysis of this result. 
One possibility is simply a network effect type of explanation, although it is not clear how this 
applies to roads for example. Alternatively, it may be the case that richer countries also 
display more favorable conditions along other dimensions (better incentive structure, more 
efficient political interactions) that provide the required conditions for a favorable effect of 
infrastructure investment. 
 
Finally, we use alternative infrastructure indicators in Table 14. Using the number of fixed 
and mobile phone lines, we inquire whether the very quick surge in mobile telephony in the 
1990s had a special effect on growth above the effect of traditional main lines, as suggested 
by Waverman, Meschi and Fuss (2005). In column 1, we use 1984-2003 averages, and 
introduce both the number of fixed line 1984-1995 and the number of fixed plus mobile lines 
 20
1996-2003. Mobile lines appear to have a significant and positive effect on GDP per capita 
growth and render the effect of fixed lines negative. This result loses significance when 
instruments are used, but again exogeneity is not rejected at usual levels.  
 
In column 3, we combine the total length of the road network and the percentage of paved 
roads, which results in only the second indicator being significant. This indicates that it is the 
quality of the road network that mostly provides growth dividends. In column 4, an indicator 
of the number of vehicles per kilometer of road is added to the specification. This variable 
now shows up positive and significant at the 5% level, while road length and proportion of 
paved road fail to be significant. If anything, this seems to indicate that, because it is usage of 
infrastructure that ultimately drives aggregate growth benefit, a proxy for the average use of 
roads capture the benefits from the extension and the quality of the network. Again, IV 
estimations yield no clear results and endogeneity is rejected. 
 
Next, we perform panel estimations using 5 year averages of the different indicators. The 
results from fixed effects vs. random effects estimations are shown in Table 15, and a 
Hausman test is performed to decide which estimation technique is more suited. In all cases, a 
full set of time dummies is included. The main conclusions are that none of the infrastructure 
indicators introduced individually is significant, except negative and significant signs for 
electricity in the random effect specification and for paved roads in the fixed effects one 
respectively. Fixed effect estimations are supported by the test in 2 out of 4 cases (telecom 
and roads). 
 
In columns 9 and 10, we introduce all four indicators together. The number of phone lines is 
positive and significant, while electricity and roads remain negative and significant. In this 
case, the Hausman test favors fixed effect estimation. Again, the interpretation of the signs of 
the coefficients, and especially the negative ones, is made difficult by the nature of the data. 
Several lines may be relevant, among which an “optimal stock” type of argument (returns 
may become negative in case of over accumulation), or arguments about investment decisions 
being politically driven and therefore departing significantly from efficiency. 
 
In Table 16, we address the issue of endogeneity. Instruments are now the lagged value of 
infrastructure indicators, as well as the ones used previously (1971 values of the share of 
agriculture in GDP, population, and population density). Following the outcome of the test in 
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column 9 and 10 of Table 15, we chose a fixed effect specification and introduce a full set of 
time period dummies. Overall, few results are again significant, with only electricity 
generating capacity being positive and significant. This holds true when all indicators are 
introduced together. Note that exogeneity is now rejected for the individual estimations with 
the number of phone lines and the electricity generating capacity.12 
4. Conclusion 
 
Our results on growth accounting are mixed: in Indonesia and the Philippines 
telecommunications investment has generated externalities and has contributed to growth 
more than other types of capital. Roads have positively influenced TFP growth in only one 
country, Thailand. In South Korea and Singapore, however, two countries which have 
markedly higher GDP than the other countries in the sample, no significant effect of 
infrastructure on TFP growth has been detected.  
 
Our cross country growth regressions provide relatively fragile results on the impact of 
infrastructure in per capita GDP growth, a conclusion that contrasts with previous studies that 
found robust results (Easterly and Servén, 1993; Calderón and Servén, 2004 among others). 
The number of phone lines appears positively related to growth in the cross country exercise, 
and some regional patterns emerge, showing above average effects for East Asia and high 
income countries. However, most results appear not to be robust when using panel techniques 
or when controlling for an endogenous response of infrastructure to growth. 
 
Our growth accounting estimates indicate that infrastructure has contributed to TFP growth in 
poorer countries, while having no significant effect in other, richer economies.  A possible 
explanation would be that poor countries have less developed infrastructure networks, and 
experience a one-off productivity dividend as they develop those networks.  But in our cross-
country growth regressions, which draw on data extending beyond East Asia, the interaction 
terms between the Low-Income dummy and infrastructure variables (Table 10 to Table 13) 
carry significantly negative coefficients.   This suggests that the explanation for the mixed 
                                                 
12 Finally, we perform Arellano-Bond IV estimations similar to the one implemented in Calderón and Servén 
(2004). Two types of instruments are used: internal ones, constituted by the lagged values of the differenced 
explanatory variables including infrastructure indicators, and the external ones used above, namely 1971 values 
of the share of agriculture in GDP, population, and population density. Only electricity generating capacity is 
significant, and its coefficient is negative. Results are not shown here to save space. 
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outcome from our growth accounting regressions could be related to factors which are 
orthogonal to GDP, such as government policies and the quality of regulation and governance.  
The two results could be reconciled with a growth story in which infrastructure constraints, if 
left unaddressed by governments, can slow the transition towards the long-run growth path, 
but do not ultimately affect the long-run rate of growth.  Governments of poor countries in 
East Asia may do a better job of addressing these constraints than governments of poor 
countries elsewhere.  
 
It is interesting to compare our results with those of Seethepalli et al (2007). As in Estache et 
al. (2005), these authors compare a “benchmark” (without infrastructure) production function 
estimated at the steady state with the same specification including infrastructure variables 
(these include physical indicators for telecom, electricity, roads, sanitation and water).13 
Using data for East Asian countries14, they find that virtually all dimensions of infrastructure 
positively influence GDP per capita when controlling for education and investment. The 
cross-country regressions have similar controls, while our growth accounting estimations both 
investment and changes in the quality of labor are captured in the APO calculations of TFP 
growth rates, making comparison meaningful. Our growth accounting results in the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand tends to support their result that telecom and road 
infrastructure enhances productivity conditional on investment and education, but not so for 
electricity. But our results from South Korea and Singapore, where no infrastructure impact 
has been found, suggest that individual countries could be at variance with the cross-country 
results of Seethepalli et al (2007).  And our growth regressions provide much weaker results 
than those obtained by Seethepalli et al. One of the reasons might be the fact that they do not 
control for the potential endogeneity of infrastructure stocks. While they argue that the use of 
stocks rather than flows mitigates the problem of reverse causation, countries may have 
unobserved characteristics that lead them both to have higher infrastructure stocks and higher 
growth. The fact that fixed effects estimations are not carried out reinforces the concern that 
this may bias the results (Holtz-Eakin, 1994). 
 
                                                 
13 This approach parallels our interpretation of our results in terms of infrastructure productivity greater than or 
less than that of other types of capital.  
14 Australia, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, South Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam. 
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 A first conclusion is therefore that the results from studies using aggregate data lack 
robustness, Indeed, as shown above, different techniques (production function, growth 
regressions, growth accounting) produce very different results, even when looking at similar 
set of countries. Moreover, similar techniques, when applied to slightly different samples, also 
fail to produce consistent results. For example, we were unable to reproduce the results from 
Calderón and Servén (2004) in our sample of 93 developing countries. 
 
Keeping these caveats in mind, what are the potential lessons for East Asian economies? 
Overall, our results give only limited support to the notion that infrastructure investment has 
driven growth in East Asia. Our results do not seem to be inconsistent with a story in which 
infrastructure can constrain growth, when that growth potential is generated exogenously, and 
that East Asian countries have been relatively successful in addressing infrastructure 
constraints as they arise. But the weakness of our data and results do not permit any definitive 
conclusions about the theoretical channels by which infrastructure may have influenced 
growth in East Asia. 
 
If indeed East Asia is more effective than other regions at responding to infrastructure 
constraints it would be useful to understand why.  Various arguments could be mounted.  For 
example, East Asia has high levels of savings, and the availability of financing may facilitate 
more rapid responses. East Asian countries have typically relied on powerful planning 
agencies, such as Japan’s MITI, etc. And to the extent that private investment in infrastructure 
has played a role in total investment, it is notable that the modalities employed in East Asia 
have differed from those employed elsewhere: for example, while East Asia focused on 
attracting investment at the wholesale level and greenfield sites (eg independent power 
producers), Latin America placed greater emphasis on the concessioning of existing retail 





Table 4. Results from growth accounting (single-country OLS estimations) 
Dependent variable : 
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R2  0.590285 0.486470 0.153937 0.069669 0.092980 
Number of observations 14 11 28 21 18 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. Results from growth accounting (panel estimations) 
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Number of observations 92 40 92 40 92 40 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6. Cross section 1971-1995, OLS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -2.528 -3.061 -3.657 -3.528 -2.665 -2.486 
 (0.970)** (1.161)** (1.239)*** (0.996)*** (1.265)** (2.058) 
GDPpc71 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
prim_expen_70 -0.053 -0.028 -0.058 -0.041 -0.060 -0.025 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.065) (0.036) (0.037) (0.058) 
second_expen_70 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
Invt_GDP7195 0.227 0.223 0.289 0.270 0.234 0.220 
 (0.042)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** (0.042)*** (0.053)*** (0.074)*** 
main7195 0.022    0.022  
 (0.003)***    (0.004)***  
egc7195  2.871    4.108 
  (2.084)    (2.577) 
rail7195   0.127    
   (1.687)    
pavroads7195    -0.172   
    (0.362)   
tel_faults7195     0.001  
     (0.003)  
elec_loss7195      0.030 
      (0.071) 
Observations 51 48 41 51 47 33 
R-squared 0.68 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.69 0.50 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
      
 
 27
Table 7. Cross section 1984-1995, OLS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -5.691 -6.385 -6.289 -8.614 -4.570 -4.183 
 (1.813)*** (1.744)*** (1.919)*** (1.483)*** (2.326)* (3.437) 
GDPpc71 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) 
prim_enrol8495 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.020 -0.010 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)* (0.014) (0.033) 
Invt_GDP8495 0.261 0.272 0.297 0.281 0.238 0.290 
 (0.066)*** (0.063)*** (0.065)*** (0.054)*** (0.075)*** (0.086)*** 
Govstab8495 0.070 0.045 -0.002 0.533 0.344 -0.113 
 (0.305) (0.317) (0.320) (0.293)* (0.321) (0.417) 
Corrup8495 0.110 0.202 0.151 0.140 -0.478 0.107 
 (0.356) (0.326) (0.417) (0.337) (0.459) (0.463) 
main8495 0.005    0.012  
 (0.004)    (0.005)**  
egc8495  -0.411    -1.629 
  (1.343)    (1.777) 
rail8495   1.262    
   (1.720)    
roads8495    -1.414   
    (0.631)**   
tel_faults8495     0.006  
     (0.005)  
elec_loss8495      -0.104 
      (0.095) 
Observations 55 54 47 49 48 42 
R-squared 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.60 0.55 0.43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8. Cross section 1971-1995, 2SLS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -2.537 -1.983 -2.839 -3.184 -4.132 27.406 
 (1.109)** (1.245) (1.341)** (1.322)** (3.062) (93.724) 
GDPpc71 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001) (0.012) 
prim_expen_70 -0.063 -0.075 -0.047 -0.047 -0.068 0.107 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.072) (0.050) (0.051) (0.614) 
second_expen_70 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.073 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.203) 
Invt_GDP7195 0.230 0.230 0.248 0.250 0.253 0.245 
 (0.042)*** (0.053)*** (0.055)*** (0.051)*** (0.048)*** (0.416) 
main7195 0.028    0.028  
 (0.013)**    (0.014)**  
egc7195  -6.453    -48.742 
  (5.223)    (164.983) 
rail7195   1.892    
   (1.522)    
pavroads7195    0.464   
    (0.429)   
tel_faults7195     0.012  
     (0.022)  
elec_loss7195      -1.881 
      (6.248) 
Observations 44 44 36 41 41 30 
Wu-Hausman F 
test, p-value 
0.70 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.83 0.28 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instruments: 
1971 Infrastructure physical stock, 1971 share of agriculture in GDP, 1971 population density. 
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Table 9. Cross section 1984-1995, 2SLS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -3.785 -6.569 -6.276 -10.275 -3.602 3.534 
 (2.091)* (3.047)** (1.999)*** (2.832)*** (2.562) (17.124) 
GDPpc71 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
prim_enrol8495 -0.011 0.030 0.017 0.023 -0.052 0.222 
 (0.022) (0.045) (0.023) (0.020) (0.032) (0.285) 
Invt_GDP8495 0.245 0.180 0.248 0.264 0.286 0.122 
 (0.070)*** (0.083)** (0.083)*** (0.078)*** (0.087)*** (0.307) 
Govstab8495 0.019 0.511 0.190 0.935 0.387 1.065 
 (0.395) (0.924) (0.417) (0.527)* (0.497) (2.511) 
Corrup8495 -0.130 -0.303 0.003 0.065 -1.030 -1.900 
 (0.368) (1.085) (0.407) (0.359) (0.591)* (3.664) 
main8495 0.024    0.047  
 (0.017)    (0.021)**  
egc8495  -5.502    -38.323 
  (14.823)    (51.504) 
rail8495   1.393    
   (1.892)    
roads8495    -1.789   
    (1.217)   
tel_faults8495     0.028  
     (0.022)  
elec_loss8495      -1.380 
      (1.764) 
Observations 48 47 44 40 43 37 
Wu-Hausman F 
test, p-value 
0.29 0.77 0.14 0.29 0.33 0.05 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instruments: 
1971 Infrastructure physical stock, 1971 share of agriculture in GDP, 1971 population density.  
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Table 10. Cross section, Telecom, regional dummies interactions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -2.577 -1.769 -0.034 2.113 
 (0.980)** (0.913)* (3.507) (5.107) 
GDPpc71 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001) (0.001)* 
prim_expen_70 -0.055 -0.063 -0.083 -0.084 
 (0.034) (0.034)* (0.097) (0.090) 
second_expen_70 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001)* (0.006) (0.005) 
Invt_GDP7195 0.229 0.220 0.065 0.148 
 (0.043)*** (0.040)*** (0.197) (0.113) 
main7195 0.029 0.022 0.027 0.000 
 (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.025) (0.000) 
EA*main -0.006  0.313  
 (0.005)  (0.339)  
LI*main  -0.222  -1.188 
  (0.066)***  (1.224) 
MI*main  0.004  0.009 
  (0.003)  (0.030) 
Observations 51 51 44 44 
R-squared 0.68 0.75   
Wu-Hausman F test, 
p-value 
  0.22 0.47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regional 
dummies: EA (East Asia), LI (low income countries), MI (middle income countries). Instruments: see Table 3 
and 4. 
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Table 11. Cross section, Energy, regional dummies interactions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -2.058 -1.085 -0.784 -0.646 
 (1.159)* (1.150) (1.752) (1.542) 
GDPpc71 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.001) 
prim_expen_70 -0.048 -0.079 -0.053 -0.093 
 (0.038) (0.037)** (0.064) (0.048)* 
second_expen_70 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Invt_GDP7195 0.197 0.188 0.106 0.182 
 (0.049)*** (0.047)*** (0.128) (0.060)*** 
egc7195 -0.899 4.450 -3.038 -0.057 
 (2.244) (1.454)*** (6.514) (6.997) 
EA*egc 4.625  32.843  
 (1.361)***  (30.305)  
LI*egc  -18.451  -19.050 
  (3.343)***  (16.486) 
MI*egc  -3.719  0.000 
  (1.186)***  (0.000) 
Observations 48 48 44 44 
R-squared 0.60 0.70   
Wu-Hausman F test, 
p-value 
  0.25 0.87 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regional 
dummies: EA (East Asia), LI (low income countries), MI (middle income countries). Instruments: see Table 3 
and 4.  
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Table 12. Cross section, Rail, regional dummies interactions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -3.245 -2.387 -0.320 -0.489 
 (1.257)** (1.138)** (2.900) (1.867) 
GDPpc71 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** 
prim_expen_70 -0.043 -0.046 0.001 -0.049 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.121) (0.081) 
second_expen_70 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.012 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Invt_GDP7195 0.241 0.224 0.024 0.172 
 (0.058)*** (0.049)*** (0.194) (0.071)** 
rail7195 0.661 52.269 4.073 -19.234 
 (1.771) (16.292)*** (2.968) (9.942)* 
EA.rail 22.630  101.633  
 (11.833)*  (78.180)  
LI.rail  -57.714  0.000 
  (16.315)***  (0.000) 
MI.rail  -50.803  23.624 
  (16.076)***  (10.950)** 
Observations 41 41 36 36 
R-squared 0.55 0.61   
Wu-Hausman F test, 
p-value 
  0.04 0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regional 
dummies: EA (East Asia), LI (low income countries), MI (middle income countries). Instruments: see Table 3 
and 4. 
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Table 13. Cross section, Roads, regional dummies interactions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -3.045 -1.686 -2.085 2.604 
 (1.043)*** (1.011) (2.169) (7.157) 
GDPpc71 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
prim_expen_70 -0.043 -0.062 -0.062 -0.087 
 (0.036) (0.034)* (0.058) (0.084) 
second_expen_70 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Invt_GDP7195 0.236 0.209 0.187 0.097 
 (0.048)*** (0.043)*** (0.109)* (0.196) 
pavroads7195 -0.101 4.250 0.353 -8.633 
 (0.350) (1.621)** (0.480) (10.902) 
EA* pavroads7195 1.746  2.914  
 (0.891)*  (4.421)  
LI* pavroads7195  -6.112  0.000 
  (1.736)***  (0.000) 
MI* pavroads7195  -4.037  9.525 
  (1.461)***  (11.397) 
Observations 51 51 41 41 
R-squared 0.59 0.65   
Wu-Hausman F test, p-
value 
  0.29 0.32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regional 
dummies: EA (East Asia), LI (low income countries), MI (middle income countries). Instruments: see Table 3 
and 4.   
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Table 14. Cross section, Alternative infrastructure indicators. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -3.083 -1.456 -3.770 -3.544 -2.077 -9.343 
 (1.624)* (4.275) (1.549)** (1.627)** (6.697) (11.441) 
GDPpc71 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) 
prim_enrol8403 -0.018 -0.026     
 (0.016) (0.033)     
second_enrol8403 0.021 -0.012     
 (0.011)* (0.050)     
Invt_GDP8403 0.073 -0.015     
 (0.377) (0.554)     
Invt_GDP8495   0.204 0.202 0.154 0.321 
   (0.054)*** (0.072)*** (0.143) (0.339) 
prim_enrol8495   0.007 0.007 -0.010 0.061 
   (0.012) (0.013) (0.058) (0.109) 
Govstab8495 (0.052) (0.157) -0.114 0.086 -0.041 0.351 
 0.412 0.488 (0.270) (0.304) (0.700) (1.133) 
Corrup8495 (0.252) (0.573) -0.066 -0.370 -0.489 0.196 
 -0.102 -0.155 (0.289) (0.347) (0.853) (1.389) 
telmain_8495 -0.014 -0.080     
 (0.008)* (0.092)     
fix+mob_9603 0.008 0.038     
 (0.003)** (0.039)     
roads_tot_8495   0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
pavroads%_8495   0.028 0.007 0.057 -0.076 
   (0.016)* (0.021) (0.087) (0.175) 
vehicles8495    0.018  0.063 
    (0.009)**  (0.095) 
Observations 46 41 53 52 41 40 
R-squared 0.64  0.48 0.52   
Wu-Hausman F 
test, p-value 
 0.34   0.82 0.42 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Instruments: see Table 3 and 4.   
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Table 15. Panel 5 years average, Fixed and random effects. 
 





















 Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Random 
Effects 
Constant -3.624 -3.580 -4.288 -5.847 -2.489 -2.503 -4.853 -8.293 3.691 -3.969 
 (2.595) (1.093)*** (6.055) (1.477)*** (6.391) (1.833) (6.059) (1.475)*** (6.833) (1.707)** 
GDPpc -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
Invt/gdp 0.111 0.145 0.093 0.109 0.147 0.196 0.087 0.134 0.113 0.186 
 (0.030)*** (0.023)*** (0.061) (0.036)*** (0.069)** (0.043)*** (0.053) (0.034)*** (0.075) (0.040)*** 
lifeexpect 0.091 0.045 0.102 0.099 0.062 0.041 0.120 0.091 -0.006 0.079 
 (0.042)** (0.020)** (0.105) (0.029)*** (0.120) (0.036) (0.103) (0.029)*** (0.129) (0.032)** 
m2/gdp -0.054 -0.006 -0.032 0.015 -0.049 -0.002 -0.020 -0.000 -0.006 0.014 
 (0.014)*** (0.008) (0.028) (0.014) (0.030) (0.016) (0.030) (0.014) (0.032) (0.015) 
imports/gd
p 
0.030 0.007 0.029 0.003 0.040 -0.012 -0.003 0.014 0.063 -0.028 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.042) (0.013) (0.040) (0.015) (0.035) (0.012) (0.047) (0.017)* 
inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
main -0.003 0.001       0.023 0.012 
 (0.003) (0.003)       (0.011)** (0.006)* 
egc   -2.427 -1.325     -6.563 -4.407 
   (1.516) (0.709)*     (2.014)*** (1.258)*** 
rail     -3.314 -1.242   -4.596 -0.642 
     (5.158) (1.093)   (5.445) (1.083) 
pav       -2.823 0.116 -4.053 -0.851 
       (1.084)*** (0.188) (1.776)** (0.448)* 
Obs 497 497 313 313 237 237 276 276 202 202 
R-squared 0.23  0.20  0.27  0.24  0.35  
Haus test 
FE vs RE 
51.06***  12.43  11.48  18.41**  19.79*  
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Full set of period dummies included.
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Table 16. Panel 5 years average, 2SLS estimations. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










 pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth pcGDPgrowth 
Constant -5.587 -17.221 -7.866 -20.282 -8.576 
 (2.496)** (6.732)** (7.535) (6.758)*** (11.968) 
GDPpc -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)* 
Invt/gdp 0.143 0.267 0.216 0.043 0.205 
 (0.031)*** (0.070)*** (0.065)*** (0.054) (0.104)** 
lifeexpect 0.106 0.239 0.094 0.340 0.071 
 (0.042)** (0.109)** (0.124) (0.106)*** (0.192) 
m2/gdp -0.057 -0.040 -0.043 -0.030 -0.081 
 (0.017)*** (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.053) 
imports/gdp 0.038 -0.070 0.023 0.045 -0.025 
 (0.021)* (0.050) (0.039) (0.039) (0.076) 
inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** 
main -0.002    -0.082 
 (0.005)    (0.052) 
egc  6.211   38.411 
  (2.714)**   (20.499)* 
rail   2.650  -11.985 
   (7.567)  (14.405) 
pav    -0.459 -6.015 
    (1.889) (5.749) 
Observations 362 218 177 202 148 
Haus test endog 
p-value 
60.17*** 38.84*** 0.15 13.12 7.28 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instruments: 
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Data Used to Construct Table 1 
 











Congo, Dem. Rep. 52934 36764
Congo, Rep. 1541 3214
Cote d'Ivoire 16038 22699
Gabon 5605 7232













Sierra Leone 2754 2549












Sri Lanka 20570 52119
South Asia 860421 2266432









Papua New Guinea 6516 11732
Solomon Islands 219 902
Pacific 9661 16590
   
China 553368 3289651
Hong Kong, China 34260 147174
Indonesia 145836 578545





East Asia 1138373 5485220






















United Kingdom 877471 1353078
United States 4276900 7972800
OECD 11925923 20899042
   
Algeria 77437 139093
Egypt, Arab Rep. 57323 183865










Saudi Arabia 164947 246567
Syrian Arab Republic 18863 47456
Tunisia 19582 45666
Turkey 164329 359470
United Arab Emirates 22440 54161
MENA 898376 1661084
   







Costa Rica 11651 25234



















Trinidad and Tobago 7342 9159
Uruguay 17484 26419
Venezuela, RB 92975 134806
LAC 1777094 3115287
 







CAPE VERDE IS. 6 7





































   




COSTA RICA 404 1165
DOMINICA 6 8
DOMINICAN REP. 732 1450














































UNITED ARAB E. 175 5390
YEMEN 14 810
MENA 21898 132510
   
   
   






SRI LANKA 381 1555
South Asia 25861 112911




Eastern Europe 38694 63828


























   
FIJI 83 200
PAPUA N.GUINEA 255 490
SOLOMON IS. 8 12
TONGA 3 7
Pacific Islands 349 709
   
CHINA 35000 204100
HONG KONG 2274 10096
INDONESIA 1259 20296










East Asia 52788 312727
 






BURKINA FASO 473 1768
BURUNDI 116 1028
CAMEROON 1125 3750






















SIERRA LEONE 1099 1743







   
BARBADOS 1216 1365
COSTA RICA 1688 5604

















   
CHINA 92000 207000
HONG KONG 1031 1594
INDONESIA 28356 153046




TAIWAN, CHINA 9415 16987
THAILAND 14058 43659
East Asia 186235 545444






























   






Eastern Europe 295982 368048





South Asia 436727 1070787
 





BURKINA FASO 2400 30043
BURUNDI 2700 17169

























SIERRA LEONE 7598 16627











   
BARBADOS 27000 90132
COSTA RICA 81000 557226
DOMINICA 2180 17800
































SRI LANKA 42500 204350
INDIA 1465415 11977999
South Asia 1770485 14601192












































Pacific Islands 17774 75597
   
CHINA 1692001 40706032
HONG KONG 837023 3278287
INDONESIA 207500 3290854






TAIWAN, CHINA 774233 9174816
THAILAND 219000 3481996
East Asia 5482022 84870367





Eastern Europe 3431585 23817042
 
 
For each value reported in Table 1, the region’s aggregate stock in 1995 is calculated as a 
multiple of the aggregate stock in 1975. 
 
 
 
